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Abstract
Health care is a growing business, but its 
trajectory patterns are hard to decipher at the 
moment. This paper provides a short overview of 
issues important for developing business models 
for the personalized medicine sector (PM). The 
paper draws on institutional theory, particularly 
transaction costs economics (TCE) in an attempt 
to draft a conceptual framework applicable 
for identifying relationship patterns among 
institutional entities, i.e. industry actors in the 
Personalized Medicine (PM) field. According 
to the theory, relationships among industry 
actors are expected to evolve depending on the 
manifestation of many contextual factors and 
their developments: investment activity, public 
interests, technology development, market 
structure, regulatory environment, demographic 
factors, personal preferences, natural factors, etc. 
In our belief, a descriptive model of an industry 
should include a broader scope of entities 
besides directly competing firms. Our rationale 
is that market actors, in a resource dependent 
environment, sustain their activity by engaging 
in (bargaining) relationships with other entities 
with vested interests in the industry. Basically, 
we believe that predictions of future industry and 
particular entities’ business model development 
would be a function of available resources, power 
relations and regulation. 
Keywords: personalized medicine, business 
model, incomplete contracts, incentives, business 
scenarios
1. INTRODUCTION
Medical science and medical practice 
have undergone radical development during 
the past decades. It is likely that amounts 
invested in research and development 
(R&D) and in developing industry capacity/
infrastructure, as well as the vested interests 
of different parties related to the industry 
will create shifts in the broader health care 
sector. According to the Forbes contributor 
Das (2017), specialized in healthcare issues 
related to transformations and convergence, 
declining operating margins and R&D 
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rates of return are forcing pharmaceutical 
companies to review their traditional 
mass production business model, rethink 
their business strategies and enter new 
markets such as personalized (or precision) 
medicine. Personalized medicine (PM), as 
a term, defines precise treatments designed 
particularly for narrow group of patients 
carrying a specific genotype. 
The development of PM is expected to 
induce changes in the broader social, tech-
nological, economic and regulatory system. 
Consequently, professionals and researchers 
in different fields involved in implementing 
PM report various challenges; medical pro-
fessionals emphasize barriers to integrating 
new medical products and procedures, lack 
of training for physicians, patients` fear of 
discrimination, higher costs of treatments, 
etc. (Najafzadeh et al., 2013; Pavelić et al., 
2016). Another group of researchers points 
out regulatory (legal) concerns related to 
complexity of intellectual property rights, 
genetic discrimination, diversity of health 
insurance systems and health economic poli-
cies in various countries, price regulation, 
etc. (Hamburg and Collins, 2010; Caulfield 
and Zarzeczny, 2014; Pope, 2013).Jakkal 
and Rossbach (2013) argue that “the greatest 
challenges” facing the personalized medicine 
field “are economic, not scientific”. Business 
wise, personalized medicine, involving multi-
level patient stratification, has the ability of 
“optimizing the cost, time and success rate 
of pharma clinical trials” by using the new 
approach and at the same time co-developing 
drug medical prescription and diagnostics 
referred as companion diagnostics (R. Das, 
2017)[1].
Moreover, as many personalized 
medicaments are developed from natural 
sources (biologic material, as opposed to 
chemically synthesized pharmaceuticals), 
they tend to be more expensive to produce 
than chemically synthesized drugs. 
Pharmaceutical representative Shaw[2] 
emphasized that those costs, in turn, will have 
to be recouped by the companies that develop 
competing products. It is safe to assume that 
the costs will probably act as “communicating 
vessels” in search of equilibrium. Thus, part 
of the financial burden related to the new 
business model will spill over to insurance 
companies who pay for the treatments, and 
it will become a growing concern for the 
patients as they are increasingly forced to bear 
a bigger share of their medical expenses in the 
form of increased out-of-pocket charges. 
We use the term business model as an 
expression convenient for extending the 
idea of organizational design beyond the 
boundaries of a single business subject. 
Therefore, the concept of business model is 
defined through network of entities related 
in value creation and appropriation. It is 
perceived as a system of interdependent 
activities, which span boundaries of a single 
firm (Zott and Amit, 2009). Morris et al. 
(2005) imply that the term “business model” 
is rather vague, yet that it implies strategic 
consideration (fit, evolution, sustainability), 
but without discarding operational issues; 
very much along the idea of value creation 
so common to economic theory. Precisely, 
these vague concepts can work well when we 
try to create a framework for understanding 
how multiple actors behave/interact in the 
process of developing PM. 
Following intensified R&D spending, 
and a change in business strategies, an 
intricate infrastructure of relationships 
among various types of interested parties is 
currently evolving. Differences in technology 
development trajectories, payback periods, 
and shifts of financial burdens between 
stakeholders demand a deeper insight into 
factors driving the development of emerging 
business models. At the same time, from the 
perspective of public authorities concerned 
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with public health, costs of medical care 
demonstrate a constant upward trend; 
and, thus, represent an important issue for 
public policy design. Both perspectives, 
market structure (investments and market 
regulation), and public health, demand 
theoretical explanations that help understand, 
predict and shape future developments. In 
the following pages, we examine information 
provided by recent reports on the industry and 
contrast the medical paradigm of traditional 
and personalized medicine, along with a 
comparison of the level of technological 
innovativeness, industry relations, financial 
and infrastructural aspects between the two 
approaches.
After providing a short theoretical 
background, we provide insights into R&D 
investment activities and trends in health 
care spending, followed by a descriptive 
model of the PM industry.
2. THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND
Economics is a science interested in 
understanding the process of value creation 
and of value distribution. It also examines 
the correlations between value distribution 
and value creation over time in expectation 
that structural differences among alternative 
structural models will demonstrate impact 
on levels of value creation and patterns 
of value distribution. In the 1980s, a role 
of the State was perceived in terms of the 
welfare effects of taxation (and consequent 
social redistributions or state aid) or through 
direct government enterprising (crowding 
out effects). Often early uptakes emphasize 
the disruptive consequences of state action 
(Pope, 2013). Contemporary economics 
takes a broader perspective of the role of 
the State and its administrative measures 
in shaping the behaviour of market actors 
by establishing standards and procedures.
Possible as the result of the “rise of the 
European regulatory state”, and in contrast 
to deregulatory approaches of the 80s, 
the State is seen as an agent of promoting 
public interests through active regulatory 
measures (Bach and Newman, 2007; 
Windholz, 2018). To our understanding, 
envisaging the development of an emerging 
technological trajectory that overlays an 
already existing “infrastructure” of multiple 
and diverse actors will require a more 
complex conventional organizational model, 
one that can provide direction for mapping 
the activities and motives of relevant actors. 
Such a model would then serve to provide 
a better understanding of the interactions 
of actors (especially power relations) that 
could support adequate policy choices. [3] 
According to Ostrom (2010), a complex 
framework of polycentric governance is 
needed in order to “specify the structure of 
the game and predict outcomes”.  
Transaction Costs Theory (TCE) 
proposes such organizational arrangements 
that should be viewed in terms of binary 
partnerships, suggesting that rules and 
administrative procedures are set up in order 
to control risks in long-term cooperation 
arrangements capable of generating results 
in high prospective economic outcomes, 
be those costs or earnings. Organizational 
measures can include establishing thresholds 
and reporting procedures for higher 
transparency, standardizing goods/service 
or clauses in contract arrangements. TCE 
has a specific definition of ownership, where 
ownership (activity internalization) becomes 
a protective measure; i.e. property rights are 
seen as a mechanism that mitigates ex post 
opportunism (Williamson, 1985), including 
moral hazard and adverse selection. 
It is not only the bargaining partners that 
are interested in lowering transaction costs, 
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but also society. In fact, government regu-
lation can produce the effect or balancing 
power relations among specific partners, 
especially since high transaction costs are 
more likely in situations involving expressed 
information asymmetry.  
Agency Theory can be employed to study 
the nature of cost and benefit distribution 
in binary relationships involving some 
kind of hierarchical relation. Extending the 
transaction costs theory to situations were 
one of the partners exhibits a dominant 
position over the other, yet cannot control 
the other’s (the inferior partner’s) operations 
and strategic development, governments/
regulators are in the position to influence 
bargaining relations among partners, 
i.e. the distribution of costs and benefits. 
The dominant rationale of governmental 
intervention/role of regulators/ thus becomes 
the role of balancing incentives.[4]
Incomplete contracts literature basically 
expands the logic of devising between-
party arrangements as does transaction 
costs theory, but with more emphasis on 
“contract clauses” that provide motivation 
for contracts partners to adhere to contract 
(Tirole, 1988; Hart, 1995). Characteristics of 
exchange include duration of the relationship, 
closeness of the future collaboration, rights 
and obligations, etc. (Smith & King, 2011).
So, if the role of contracts is providing 
ex-ante determination of a two party rela-
tionship, contract clause will address the 
characteristics of exchange object, as a way 
of specifying performance targets that can 
be monitored. In that aspect, contract theory 
is consistent with the concept of monitoring 
in agency theory. The parties’ behaviour is 
not only controlled by specified (identifi-
able) technical measures. Incentives are 
not precisely identified, but could be pre-
supposed as being “intrinsic” to a contract 
party, such as the incentive to preserve good 
reputation, which is similar to idea of bond-
ing in agency costs theory. In fact, the idea 
of contracts promoted by contract theory is 
that a contracting relation is a complex so-
cial construct, where implicit mechanisms 
can act as strong mechanism for reducing di-
rect transaction costs, assessing predictable 
risks, but also controlling (at least partly) 
some of the risks that cannot be anticipated 
in the ex-ante period. Due to the phenomena 
of bounded rationality, asymmetric and in-
complete information, uncertain future cir-
cumstances, opposed interests, and different 
motives/incentives of contracting /collabo-
rating parties, contracts cannot be observed 
as complete embodiments of an agreement. 
Thus, contracts are usually incomplete, and 
serve to protect one side ex ante investment 
against other side`s ex post opportunism 
(Bolton & Dewatripont, 2005). 
Considering PM, there are at least three 
obvious economic consequences of this 
new approach: focusing on smaller patients’ 
groups, instead of on whole/broader popu-
lations, imposing variations in time and pa-
tient treatment procedures, thus disrupting 
stable processes, with the consequence of 
disrupting existing economies of scale. An-
other important economic phenomenon oc-
curs on industry/market level. Technological 
innovations require high R&D costs and ex-
tensive marketing efforts, promoting the ten-
dency of industry power concentration. The 
usual economic framework used to establish 
efficiency of R&D reflects on rate of returns, 
i.e. time and scope of R&D paybacks, ex-
tending focus to spill over effects and allow-
ing policy makers to establish “policy tools” 
intended for establishing principles of value 
appropriation and capacity creation, thus 
achieving best performance in dynamic mar-
kets (Martin & Eisenhardt, 2004, pp. 357-
382; Mance et al., 2016). It the case of PM, 
it is important to stress that technology diffu-
sion is as important as technology creation. 
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Therefore, the payback of initial R&D in-
vestments depends on the pace and scope of 
market creation. In market creation, efforts 
are seen to be oriented towards multiple and 
diverse actors, such as governmental bodies, 
health care institutions, as well as towards 
individuals. A third point to be observed 
concerns social costs of PM creation and dif-
fusion. As national health care systems are 
dominantly financed from public sources, 
a policy seeking to promote PM is likely to 
squeeze out resources of existing institutions 
and health-care practice. This extends the is-
sue of power relations, i.e. capacity endow-
ment, value creation and value appropria-
tion, also inside existing sub-systems. 
3. MAPPING AN INDUSTRY 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT FOR 
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE
Considering the broad and diversified 
scope of activities and actors involved, it is 
likely that building a sustainable model of 
interactions among actors will require active 
involvement of public authorities (Sokolic et 
al., 2014).
There are basically two available ap-
proaches in mapping economic activities 
and value flows. Process based approachis 
more technical and often searches for capac-
ity balance; it will define production stage 
processes and eventually specify capacity at 
each stage in an effort to streamline resourc-
Table 1: Contrasting approaches in mapping organizational models
General approach Process based Entity based
Dimension best 
illustrated
Technological flow and
Sequencing of activities
Asset ownership
Legal and financial aspects
Elementary  
unit
(building block)
Technological units (plants; 
scale economies)
Technical compatibility and 
proximity of consecutive 
technological steps
Bundles of resources (scale and scope 
economies at single entity or network 
level)
Decision making centres (driving 
actors)
Problem most 
likely to be 
observed 
Missing links
Inadequate capacity to maintain 
flow
Bargaining positions - Power 
asymmetries
Transfer of resources (distribution 
effects)
Legal and ownership – public/private; 
crossholdings (vested interests) 
Underlying 
economic 
reasoning
Optimization of process flow
(capacity building and smooth 
efficient throughput)
Value appropriation
Problem 
resolution
Planning pace and quantities 
along the chain 
Streamlining capacity
Regulation of entity establishment - 
setting scope of action (presence & 
size)
Regulation at interfaces – interfering 
with bargaining power
Source: Authors
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es (prevent shortages and enable full capac-
ity utilization) and shorten process time. The 
second,“Entity based”, approach involves 
mapping legal entities. These approaches 
can be motivated by technologically induced 
savings, such as lower transportation costs 
that may result from geographic proximity 
of two warehouses. However, in economic 
reasoning, mapping sectors by identifying 
lead actors (size and economic or investment 
capacity differences among actors, or market 
concentration at value chain levels) may al-
low for the estimation of bargaining power 
and value appropriation. Table 1 points out 
to the major differences implied by these 
two approaches.
For the purpose of our analysis, we be-
lieve the entity approach is better suited for 
explaining the roles of actors involved. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the main actors in the PM 
sector in the entity perspective.
The figure is a simplified representation 
of the entity approach. Model entities were 
defined according to technological function. 
No particular legal entity has been identified 
at this stage. Shades of gray indicate status, 
which, in this frame, performs the role of 
functional clusters; i.e. type of legal struc-
ture. The idea was that different types of 
organizational entities have different forma-
tion logic in a sense that they possess various 
levels of institutional stability, have different 
strategic goals (for profit, governmental, col-
lective representation-non-profit, etc.), dif-
ferent power of argumentation (information 
asymmetry), and ownership as source of as-
set provision and logic of decision-making.
Based on the distinctive features of insti-
tution types, we proceeded to identify per-
sonal interests that govern actor’s behaviour. 
Their representatives are listed in Table 2. 
In the next section, we present some 
figures that illustrate the specific PM context 
at the moment. Particularly, we point some of 
the reasons why governments are expected 
to take a more active role in shaping PM 
future. 
Source: Authors 
Figure 1: Main actors in personalized medicine industry
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4. RATIONALE FOR 
GOVERNMENT´S 
INVOLVEMENT IN 
SUPPORTING PERSONALIZED 
MEDICINE
The impact of State in shaping actors’ 
behaviour is to be carefully considered. It 
occurs either through efforts in mitigating 
possible inefficient power imbalances 
(regulating markets), or as an agent in 
providing maximum public welfare. 
The rationale for closergovernment´s 
involvement in PM development is 
very much related to long-term trend in 
health care (HC) financing. As total HC 
expenditures rise (Figure 2), technologies 
promising cost efficiency attract the interest 
of policy makers. 
The role of the State, and one of the 
reasons why state investments lead beyond 
private sector investments, is to facilitate 
the emergence of an infrastructural and 
institutional environment that will promote 
value creation and speed up development 
and dissemination. Available measures of 
government intervention are twofold:
1. Supplementing private investments, 
wherever public interest exists, on those 
stages of the value chain (or at the nods in a 
polycentric governance model);
2. Providing administrative measures in 
shaping the behaviour of market actors by 
licensing institutions, products and proce-
dures, and establishing standards. 
General government heath expenditure 
dominates in total HC expenditures in most 
developed countries. As can be seen from 
Figure 5, EU has as much as 75% of total 
health spending financed by public funds. 
Table 2:  Comparison of personal interests between traditional and personalized medicine
REGULATION, LEGAL AND 
ETHICAL ISSUES Traditional Medicine Personalized Medicine
- Legal framework Predictive  Vague  
- Ethical issues Controlled by known 
procedures 
Unknown, vague, under- 
defined
- Public trust High Yet to be acquired 
PERSONAL INTEREST VESTED
- Clinicians Reputation Reputation and personal 
development
- Researchers Recognition 
Recognition and personal 
motivation for working w/ 
cutting edge technology
- Patient Return to pre-symptom 
state
QALY  
(Quality Adjusted Life Years)
- Insurance clerks Volume seeking
Oblivious to customer`s 
situation, dependent of 
artificial intelligence (AI)
- HC managers Budgeting Reputation
- Corporate investors Profits (ROI) Profits (ROI)
Source: Authors.
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Source: World Health Organization (WHO), 2017. 
Figure 2: Total Health Expenditure (THE) per Capita in US$
Source: World Health Organization (WHO), 2017.
Figure 3: General Government Health Expenditure (GGHE) as % of Total Health Expenditure
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Source: World Health Organization (WHO), 2017 
Figure 4: General Government Health Expenditure (GGHE) as % of  
General government expenditure (GGE) 
This proportion has been stable for the 
past two decades. During this same period, 
the EU average proportion of HC spending 
in total government expenditure has risen by 
more than 2%, from 11% in 1995 to 14% in 
2014. The total HC expenditure in GDP for 
EU27 has gone from 7% to 9%. The figures 
indicate that heath care provision is a very 
important financial burden on society as a 
whole (Figure 3).
PM technology does not promise to de-
crease this burden. Instead, expects the per-
sonalized treatments to yield drop of total 
treatment costs and better the health status 
of individual patients (studies by medical 
professionals have been conducted on can-
cer patients), thus, lessening the need for 
HC interventions. On the other hand, having 
in view high cost of developing and imple-
menting new treatments, as well as the ag-
ing of the world population, it is not likely 
that health care costs will go down. This fact 
encourages the study of regulation mecha-
nisms, since medicine is already very much 
“under the jurisdiction” of the State. The im-
mediate question raised is about “spillages” 
that may be happening at the private-public 
interfaces. However, a more important issue 
may soon become whether power asym-
metries might be misdirecting resources. In 
the next section we are trying to explain our 
concerns. The refinement and upgrading of 
our descriptive industry model may help the 
State (regulator) in understanding value for-
mation, spotting critical relationships, iden-
tifying resource pools and better mediating 
processes and relationships though an effec-
tive and efficient policy.
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5. CRITICAL POINTS FOR 
FURTHER PERSONALIZED 
MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT 
As noted before, investment activity is 
one of the main indicators of industry dy-
namics. Technological innovation in PM 
can undoubtedly be described as a market 
disruptive technology (Kastelan Mrak & 
Bodiroga Vukobrat, 2016). As such, PM, 
as well as the broader health care sector, 
provide an arena for private investors seek-
ing investment opportunities. Many market 
analysts and global consulting companies, 
such as The Blackrock Investment Institute, 
describe HC industry in 2017 reports as in-
novative, yet risky and highly impacted by 
regulation (and current public policy issues). 
Current investment activity is likely to gen-
erate future power relations in extents that 
surpass business profit considerations, but 
affect transnational power/market structure. 
Trends in investors` markets and stakehold-
ers’ considerations have been recently re-
searched by Milne et al. (2015) and analysed 
by market specialists and financial advisors, 
such as Deloitte and the already mentioned 
Blackrock Investment Institute.
Key Biotechnology Indicators (OECD, 
October 2016) show investments in Biotech 
R&D to be the highest in the US at 38.6 
billion USD (ppp) in the business sector 
compared to France, at US 3.3 billion, as a 
country with the second highest investment 
(Figure 5).
However, it is not only the development 
of genetically based diagnostic and treat-
ment procedures that are revolutionizing 
health care, or biotech as a related field. 
To be considered are also the R&D activi-
ties in the related industries. The impact of 
ICT development and digitization has been 
noticed and estimated as crucial for PM de-
velopment and implementation (HC digital 
transformation in Chilukuri & Van Kuiken, 
2017, biobanking in Hewitt, 2011; Olson et 
al., 2014; Fleming et al., 2015). 
Source: OECD, Key Biotechnology Indicators, http://oe.cd/kbi; and OECD, Main Science and Technology Indica-
tors Database, www.oecd.org/sti/msti.htm, October 2016.
Figure 5: Biotech R&D investments in the business sector
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Source: OECD statistics (2017), http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/keybiotechnologyindicators.htm
Figure 6: R&D activity by number of patents per industry and country
Source: OECD, Key Biotechnology Indicators, http://oe.cd/kbi; and OECD, Main Science and Technology Indica-
tors Database, www.oecd.org/sti/msti.htm, October 2016.
Figure 7: Total public R&D in biotech
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Table 3: Comparison of the business logic of traditional and personalized medicine
TRADITIONAL MEDICINE PERSONALIZED MEDICINE
MEDICAL PARADIGM Segmented Holistic
- Process activating entity Patient Provider of funding
- Patient assessment and 
treatment
On call /per case Life-long schemes
- Point of initiating of patient 
treatment
Ex post (upon symptom) Preventive (before symptom)
LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL INOVATIVNESS
- Continuity in relation to past 
medical practices
High Low 
- Average time to market for a 
product/ process/ treatment
Longer Short (crucial)
- R&D payback horizon Longer Short and variable
- Patent protection duration 
(years)
Longer (5-20) Shorter (> 5)
- Incidence of cutting-edge 
innovation
Rare Common 
INDUSTRY ATTRIBUTES 
- Level of importance of 
pipeline
Medium High 
- Critical process stage 
(bottleneck)
Production and distribution R&D 
- Scale (size of the population) Large cohorts of non-differentiated patients
Stratified genotype populations 
(small)
- Inter-industrial relations
(at production stages)
Specialized  
(distinction among production 
stages apparent)
Integrated 
(distinction among production 
stages less apparent)
- Intra-industrial relations 
(market concentration)
Concentrated Dispersed/specialized
FINANCIAL ISSUES
- Costing patterns Administrative pricing, budgeting 
Open-ended, 
 treatment based
- Dominant R&D funding 
sources
Public
Corporate/Public 
(depending on institutional 
setting)
- Price setting principle (policy) Standardized Treatment based
- Sources for financing patient 
treatments
Public
Insurance funds 
(mostly private)
- Readiness of private 
insurances to extend 
coverage
Depends on market trends 
(market leader following)
Volatile  
(depending on “patient” profit/
QALY prospects)
- Ability to objectively asses 
customer risk
Lower Likely very high
IT INFRASTRUCTURE
- Information infrastructure Physical and digital archive Big data 
- Data availability Complex Even more complex
Source: Authors
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In comparison to the Biotech, the Medical 
and the Pharmaceutical sectors, the number 
of patents in ICT over the period 1998-2013 
(data for 2013 being the last available) have 
approximately tripled the number of patents 
in the industries directly related to Health 
Care. Figure 6 also indicates the outstanding 
difference between countries, where the US 
significantly outperforms leading European 
countries.
It is also interesting to compare 
public investments by region. Growing 
HC expenditures make PM attractive to 
governments due to promised efficiency 
gains in terms of costs per quality-
adjusted-life-years (QALY), with the size 
of investments undertaken by public and 
private investors growing. In that respect, 
Germany at 6.8 billion USD (ppp) more than 
twice exceeds Korea’s investment, as the 
second largest country in public investments in 
biotech R&D (Figure 3).
The above figures indicate that the 
present situation is very diverse, when 
comparing countries and public health 
financing models. Nevertheless, we have 
still attempted to systemize comparative 
differences between the traditional medicine 
and personalized medicine paradigm. Our 
view of the differences between the two 
paradigms (Table 3) rests on the distinctive 
patterns pointed out in Tables 1 (Contrasting 
approaches in mapping industry models), 
Table 2 (Comparison of personal interests 
between traditional and personalized 
medicine) and Figure 1 (Main actors in 
personalized medicine industry).
A constant and rapid technological 
development, which results from intensive 
R&D investments, is reflected inmarket 
segmentation. Markets are becoming more 
and more fragmented, to the point (in the 
future) of becoming truly personalized: one 
person - one specific trajectory of life-long 
treatment. This implies personalized health 
care costs, a perspective that puts the state and 
commercial insurance funds at a crossroad, 
challenging the  regulators to decide on how 
much of personally “generated” health care 
expenses should be “socialized”. 
Apart from this social and political 
consideration, economists focus also on 
the differences between the two medical 
paradigms that can be expected in terms of 
market creation. Such factors include: market 
structure, financing capacity (available 
resources and their distribution), value 
creation and appropriation cycles (payback 
horizons), scale issues, and other factors 
we deemed interesting for investors and 
public authorities trying to shape industry 
development. Almost in all of the listed 
categories, we estimate that PM disrupts the 
common logic of established business model 
(based on clear flow, balanced capacity, and 
scale economies of standardized products 
and treatment). A higher variability implied 
by treatments designed upon personal (small 
cohorts’) specifics adds a great deal of 
volatility to the costs and effects of medical 
treatment that becomes very case specific 
and therefore more complicated to plan in 
market share/payback effects (return on 
investment for corporate investors) and in 
budgetary terms (public financing models). 
On the other hand, personal genetic 
testing increases the possibility of 
planning future/life-long risks and medical 
procedures; the implication being one “form” 
of predictiveness is replaced by another. Big 
data, as ICT infrastructural precondition for 
PM, also allows for the capture of life-style 
data, which is to some extent already being 
collected (for marketing purposes), but may 
be applied for “calculating” health risks in 
combination to genetic data.
6. CONCLUSION
From the perspective of developing 
market trends in pharmaceutical industry, 
biotechnology, life sciences and other sectors 
related to personalized medicine field, major 
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investments in the basic science have been 
made, rendering the industry very dynamic. 
Technology developments in personalized 
medicine have enabled the development 
of new diagnostic tests and diagnostic 
procedures, as well as drugs and treatment 
methods and protocols. It is likely that 
amounts invested in the system (increasing 
of available resources), as well as the identity 
of investors (and relative power relations) 
will create shifts in the broader health care 
sector. As such, the PM industry represents 
an exciting arena for investors, researchers 
and policy makers. 
This paper elaborates a segment of a 
broader research on determining value of 
a next generation medical system. Even 
though available data on personalized 
medicine is fragmented because of the many 
different angles that researchers take when 
trying to predict future developments, by 
combining different sources of information, 
and by developing a theory based industry 
model, we point to some considerations we 
find relevant for understanding personalized 
medicine development. Any evidence 
and highlights may in fact be treated as 
“circumstantial”, yet other authors seem to 
confirm the disruptiveness of personalized 
medicine as a new medical paradigm. Based 
on important industry features and trends, our 
descriptive model identified main industry 
actors. Their systematization in terms of 
purpose or formation logic (public-private), 
and extent of possible active impact on 
industry development, guided us in creating 
a list of relevant features that compare the 
business logic of traditional and personalized 
medicine. Therefore, the contribution of this 
paper lies primarily in identifying points of 
consideration for public authorities-policy 
makers if they wish to promote faster PM 
development. 
The data indicate that R&D in 
personalized medicine and ICT innovation 
are still the driving forces for maintaining 
future growth. However, if regulation (state 
action) was to make the sector less volatile, 
investment activity would continue at a 
high level. A possible consideration to be 
addressed by future research is identifying 
main beneficiaries and value pockets. After 
obtaining these insights, we feel more 
confident about continuing our research in 
understanding of incentives of main groups of 
stakeholders specified in our industry model.
For further research, an analysis of 
national health care system is suggested to 
identify business model alternatives and 
perspectives on personalized medicine 
implementation. 
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RAZVOJ MODELA INDUSTRIJE PERSONALIZIRANE 
MEDICINE
Sažetak
Zdravstvena industrija je brzo rastući sektor, 
ali smjerove njezina razvoja je trenutno teško 
predvidjeti. U ovom se radu iznosi kratki pregled 
čimbenika, značajnih za razvoj poslovnih modela 
u području personalizirane medicine. Rad se 
zasniva na doprinosima institucionalne teorije, 
a posebno ekonomike transakcijskih troškova 
te pokušava razviti konceptualni model, koji 
bi se mogao primijeniti na utvrđivanje odnosa 
između organizacija, odnosno industrijskih 
aktera u području personalizirane medicine. U 
skladu s teorijskim određenjima, odnosi između 
industrijskih aktera bi se trebali razvijati u skladu 
s manifestacijama brojnih faktora konteksta i 
njihovog razvoja, a što uključuje: investicijsku 
aktivnost, javni interes, razvoj tehnologije, tržišnu 
strukturu, regulatorno okruženje, demografske 
čimbenike, osobne preferencije, prirodne 
čimbenike, itd. Autori vjeruju da bi deskriptivni 
industrijski model trebao obuhvaćati veći broj 
organizacija, osim direktnih konkurenata, i to na 
temelju uvjerenja da tržišni akteri, u okruženju 
koje ovisi o resursima, održavaju svoje aktivnosti 
kroz angažman u održavanju odnosa s drugim 
organizacijama, koje imaju skrivene interese. 
Stoga autori smatraju da će predviđanje budućeg 
industrijskog razvoja i razvoja poslovnih modela 
konkretnih poduzeća ovisiti o raspoloživim 
resursima, odnosima moći i regulaciji.
Ključne riječi: personalizirana medicina, 
poslovni model, nepotpuni ugovori, poticaji, 
poslovni scenariji
1 Highlights added by authors.
2 Winfred Shaw is senior director of the Precision Medicine Center for Excellence at Quintiles, a company that 
provides services and solutions to biopharmaceutical companies (in Mangan, D. (2015), Personalized medicine: 
Better results, but at what cost?, CNBC interview, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/04/personalized-medicine-
better-results-but-at-what-cost.html, accessed on April 17th 2017).
3 The conceptual model would help in defining critical regulation points and advice choice of regulatory 
instruments, ultimately affecting the distribution incentives, that is of costs and benefits fits into a dynamic 
development model.
4 Controlling original balance of power created by unregulated markets.
